Under the EU’s unanimity rule, one member state can halt decisions on foreign policy, sanctions, taxation, and enlargement. With 27 members at the table, there is significant potential for deadlock, and in recent years, it has moved from a theoretical risk to a political reality.
ADVERTISEMENT
ADVERTISEMENT
Hungary has used the veto, or threatened to, to block or delay Ukraine aid, EU sanctions on Russia, and budget decisions repeatedly since 2022. Experts note a shift in how the veto is used.
“Vetoes are used as political leverage for unrelated goals,” says Thu Nguyen, acting co-director of the Jacques Delors Centre. “Sometimes to unlock EU funds or appeal to domestic voters.”
EU institutions are exhausting every procedural option as the deadlock drags on. Foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas made clear on March 19 that the bloc has mechanisms to break it, but only decisive leadership will deliver results.
The debate is no longer just about Hungary. It is about whether the EU’s decision-making architecture is fit for purpose amid geopolitical pressure.
A new form of escalation
Nguyen points to the €90 billion Ukraine loan package, agreed in December 2025 with an opt-out for Hungary, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic, as a watershed moment. Hungary subsequently moved to veto the enhanced cooperation arrangement it had already agreed not to block.
“This is, I think, the first time where a member state is vetoing a decision after there had been agreement to, in fact, not veto the decision,” she says. “That veto that comes after having agreed not to veto it is also a new form of use that we have not seen before.”
Dr Patrick Müller, Professor for European Studies at the University of Vienna and the Vienna School for International Studies, describes the broader dynamic as deliberate and strategic. “One could just call it blackmail or hard bargaining,” he says. “But the way Hungary goes about it is that it tries to veil this link, so it’s not easy to detect because it’s not explicit.”
There are four main tools the EU can use to work around a veto. None of them is clean. All of them carry trade-offs.
Passerelle clauses: the switch nobody flips
Treaty provisions known as passerelle clauses allow the EU to shift from unanimity to qualified majority voting without rewriting the treaties. The general clause covers most policy areas except defence. A CFSP-specific clause applies to non-military foreign policy. Both require unanimous approval by the European Council to activate.
Activating these clauses demands the same consensus they aim to replace. Since their 2009 introduction, none has been used. As Nguyen says, “The big problem is you can only end unanimity with unanimity.”
Constructive abstention: opting out without shutting down
Under EU foreign policy rules, a member state can abstain from voting rather than block it, pledging not to interfere with the decision while distancing itself politically. It has been used twice. In 2008, Cyprus abstained on the launch of EULEX Kosovo.
In 2022, Ireland, Austria, and Malta abstained from allowing lethal aid to Ukraine through the European Peace Facility, unwilling to co-fund weapons deliveries but unwilling to stop others from doing so.
Constructive abstention is a niche tool. It only works if a state steps aside rather than fights.
Coalitions of the willing: moving without the full bloc
Nine or more member states can use enhanced cooperation to advance integration, using qualified majority voting internally. The EU has used this to unlock €90 billion for Ukraine (2026–2027) and drive Repower EU’s plan to exit Russian fossil fuels by 2027.
But Nguyen warns that the limits of this approach are already visible. “We have seen European Council conclusions now split in two, a general one with all 27 member states, and one that relates to Ukraine with only 26,” she says. “That creates the impression that the EU is not able to act as one unity and not able to act decisively and efficiently.”
Article 122: The emergency clause under strain
Article 122 lets the Council act by qualified majority in severe economic or exceptional circumstances, bypassing unanimity. The EU used this to reframe Ukraine loan disbursements as the implementation of asset-freeze measures, sidelining Hungary’s objections without formally overriding its veto.
Legal experts are sharply divided. Proponents say it is legitimate treaty flexibility under genuine crisis conditions. Critics argue that the clause lacks a defined emergency threshold, making it vulnerable to abuse and to potential annulment by the Court of Justice of the EU. No annulment has succeeded yet. But litigation is growing, and each new invocation adds to the legal exposure.
The Article 7
One rarely discussed mechanism: Article 7 of the TEU allows the EU to suspend a member’s voting rights if it breaches EU values. It was triggered against Hungary in 2018 but has stalled.
“There is a procedure that allows the EU to suspend the voting rights of a member state that fundamentally breaches the values of the European Union,” Nguyen notes. “If there is any solution, it would probably be this one.” But she acknowledges the practical obstacles: “There has always been a lot of reluctance in the Council to implement this very drastic measure, and there has also always been more than one member state that perhaps runs the risk of having its rights suspended under Article 7.”
The EU is not changing its rules. It is bending them more frequently and more creatively than ever before.
Müller argues the bigger risk is what repeated workarounds signal to other governments. “If we go for easy fixes, if we go for compromises and give a government the feeling that this hostage taking is a way to blackmail us, you create incentives to do it in the future as well,” he says.
